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I. INTRODUCTION: OF CROCODILE TEARS
Over the past several years there has been considerable debate as
to whether federal agencies should develop law and policy by adjudica-
tion, a traditional "lawmaking" forum, or by rulemaking, a forum
unique to agencies. The consensus is that, in both theory and practice,
rulemaking is the superior forum. It permits broad-based participation
that benefits the affected public and educates the agency, its procedures
expedite policy development, and its requirement that standards be
codified and published promotes clarity and uniform application of
law.' Thus, the rulemaking process has been acclaimed as one of the
"greatest inventions of modem government," and the agencies' failure
to utilize it has been deplored.2 But these laments may be, in the words
of Judge Friendly, no more than "crocodile tears."'3
The commonplace opinion is that the agencies can, in their discre-
tion, formulate law and policy, which is to say rules, by adjudication as
well as rulemaking. 4 Consequently, the courts, in their task of holding
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THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 752];
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) [hereinafter cited as APA LEG. HISTORY];
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITrEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT, S.
Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) [hereinafter cited as ATT'y GENERAL'S REP.].
1. See generally Bernstein, The NLRB's .4djudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970); Elman, Rulemaking Procedures in the FTC's
Enforcement of the Merger Law, 78 HARV. L. REV. 385 (1964); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making
Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961); Shapiro, The Choice of
Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921
(1965); Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 COR-
NELL L. REV. 375, 376 (1974).
2. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6:1 (2d ed. 1978).
3. H. & F. Binch Co. v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 357, 365 (2d Cir. 1972).
4. "It has become well established that agencies which possess both adjudication and rule-
making powers covering the same subject matter generally may choose whether to proceed by
means of adjudication or of rule making in resolving particular policy problems confronting
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the agencies to appointed procedures, have stopped short of an effective
rulemaking requirement; rather, they have allowed the agencies the
discretion to develop rules by adjudication. The errors in this are at
least twofold. First, it is contrary to the mandate of Congress that, in a
broad sphere, rulemaking procedures are an exclusive process for the
development of rules.5 Second, the present "abuse of discretion" stan-
dard6 for determining the propriety of rulemaking vis-a-vis adjudica-
tion precludes analysis of whether the agency action in question is in
fact a lawmaking activity that should be subject to the rulemaking
process. 7
This Article in Part II examines the legislative requirement of a
mandatory rulemaking process; Part III discusses the Supreme Court's
obfuscation of this mandate. Finally, Part IV analyzes the sphere of
agency action that recent case law identifies as subject to the rulemak-
ing process. The purpose of this Article is not to rehash policy argu-
ments as to the relative merits of rulemaking and adjudication in
agency development of law and policy. Rather, the aim is to clarify the
controlling legislative resolution of this problem.
II. THE CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE OF RULEMAKING
Congress often enacts regulatory legislation with broad substan-
tive provisions: enactments, for example, making illegal "unfair labor
practices."' 8 Congress then delegates to an agency the task of defining
precisely the range of proscribed conduct. At the agency level these
statutes might be implemented in an ad hoc fashion by a series of adju-
dications applying the broad statute to the specific conduct of specific
parties. From these adjudications, standards more precisely defining
the statutory mandate may be developed. Creating these standards
through adjudication is a lawmaking activity on the part of the
agency-a kind of lawmaking that gains a ready acceptance when one
them." Fuchs, Development and Diversfcation in Administrative Rule Making, 72 Nw. U.L. REV.
83, 89 (1977). See also cases cited at note 89 infra.
5. See notes 20-61 infra and accompanying text.
6. See text accompanying notes 135-37 infra.
7. While there has been considerable "policy" debate as to the merits of rulemaking vis-a-
vis adjudication, little attention has been directed to the controlling mandate of Congress. For
example, one article comparing the rulemaking and adjudicatory processes addresses this issue in
a footnote, stating that "[ilt has been suggested that an agency may under some circumstances be
violating the rulemaking requirements of the APA when it formulates rules in adjudication."
Shapiro, supra note 1, at 927 n.21. The suggested solution was that "an agency is subject to those
requirements [rulemaking] only when it is acting as a legislature would, not when it is acting as a
court." Id This approach, it seems, only begs the larger question: when should an agency act like
a legislature and when should it act like a court?
8. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1976).
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considers that this is how the courts make law.
Congress, however, cognizant of the broad lawmaking authority
that it delegates to agencies, sought to supplant the adjudication model
of lawmaking with a superior process. In section 4 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA),9 Congress circumscribed agency lawmaking
activities by imposing a procedure unique to agencies: it required that
rules be formulated pursuant to "notice and comment" procedures and
that these rules be codified and published.'0 That Congress linked its
delegation of lawmaking authority to this rulemaking process has not
gone unobserved. As stated by the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit, "the premise supporting congressional and judicial approval of
such vague delegations is that the agency, through the rulemaking and
administrative process, will gradually fill in areas of uncertainty with
specific rules.""II
The rulemaking process that Congress established in its plenary
authority can be described as a legislative-like hearing,12 with the mini-
mal procedural requirements of notice to the interested public of a pro-
posed rule and an opportunity to comment on the substance of that
rule. "Notice," including the time and place of the proceeding and the
subject matter of the proposed rule, must be published in the Federal
Register.' 3 "Interested persons" may then participate by submitting
9. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d) (1976).
11. South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 670 (lst Cir. 1974). See also Morton v.
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1973):
The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created and
funded program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to
fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.... This agency power to make
rules that affect substantial individual rights and obligations carries with it the responsi-
bility ... to employ procedures that conform to the law.
Id at 231-32; Aiken v. Obledo, 442 F. Supp. 628, 651 (E.D. Cal. 1977) (when Congress has only
"roughed-in its program," rulemaking is essential).
12. Rulemaking is a legislative-like activity appropriate to Congress and its delegatees-the
agencies. According to an authoritative study of the administrative process, "the whole field of
rule-making. . . is outside the constitutional competence of the courts, for rules do not determine
the rights of specific litigants but, like statutes, are addressed to people generally." Ai-r'y GEN-
ERAL'S REP. 12.
The courts do hold the agencies to observing proper procedures in rulemaking. However,
procedures established by Congress are controlling, because due process does not apply to proce-
dures incidental to the formulation of rules. See Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S.
441(1915).
13. These "notice and comment" procedures are contained in section 4 of the APA. Section
4(a) provides:
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data, views, or arguments.' 4 These simple "notice and comment" pro-
cedures, while permitting broad public participation in the formulation
of rules, are at the same time calculated to avoid the delays and com-
plexities of more cumbersome adjudicative procedures. 15 Moreover, in
rulemaking, unlike adjudication, the agency's ability to utilize the ad-
vice of staff experts, outside experts, or relevant studies is not limited.16
Although ex parte contacts may be unfair to the individual litigants in
an adjudication, they are useful to lawmaking forums.17 Finally, after
deciding to adopt a rule, the agency must publish it in the Federal Reg-
ister at least thirty days before its effective date.'3
These rulemaking procedures are aimed at providing a codified
and published system of rules of prospective operation, guaranteeing
the affected segments of the public a right to participate in rule devel-
opment. By contrast, the adjudicatory procedures of the Administra-
General notice of proposed rule making shall' be published in the Federal Register,
unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have
actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall include-
(I) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the sub-
jects and issues involved.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976).
14. This right to comment is provided by section 4(b) of the APA: "After notice required by
this section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule mak-
ing through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral
presentation." Id. § 553(c).
15. "Especially in the rapidly expanding realms of economic, environmental and energy reg-
ulation, the policy disputes are too sharp, the technological considerations too complex, the inter-
ests affected too numerous, and the missions too urgent for agencies to rely on the ponderous
workings of adjudication." Wright, supra note 1, at 376. These considerations motivated Con-
gress.in establishing separate rulemaking and adjudicatory proceedings, as suggested by the Sen-
ate report on the APA:
Proceedings are classed as rule making under this act not merely because, like the legis-
lative process, they result in regulations of general applicability but also because they
involve subject matter demanding judgments based on technical knowledge and experi-
ence. . . . In many instances of adjudication, on the other hand, the accusatory element
is strong, and individual compliance or behavior is challenged; in such cases, special
procedural safeguards should be provided to insure fair judgments on the facts as they
may properly appear of record. The statute carefully differentiates between these two
basically different classes of proceedings so as to avoid, on the one hand, too cumber-
some a procedure and to require, on the other hand, an adequate procedure.
S. REP. No. 752 app. at 39. A recent congressional study reaffirmed this original assessment of
adjudicatory procedures, finding that rulemaking is a more expedient procedure for developing
new standards. 4 SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., STUDY
ON FEDERAL REGULATION 26-35 (1977).
16. The APA precludes "ex parte contacts" only during the course of adjudicatory proceed-
ings. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 557(d) (1976).
17. "The technicalities of adjudication allow lawyers to minimize the input of experts and to
frustrate agency consideration of relevant scientific and economic perspectives." Wright, supra
note 1, at 376.
18. Administrative Procedure Act § 4(c), 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1976).
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tive Procedure Act are backward-looking, "accusatorial" proceedings,
with special procedural safeguards "designed not for the development
of policy," but to provide an opportunity for the individual litigants to
develop facts unique to them. 19 An examination of the text of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act and its legislative history reveals that Con-
gress intended rulemaking to be a mandatory process for development
of law and policy, deliberately excluding adjudication as an alternative
lawmaking procedure.
A. Rule Formulation. Notice and Comment.
Congress' reasons for mandatory rulemaking were grounded in the
belief that responsiveness to the public sector is inherent to lawmaking.
The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act demon-
strates that Congress intended its delegated lawmaking function to re-
main subject to public participation and scrutiny: "Day by day
Congress takes account of the interests and desires of the people in
framing legislation and there is no reason why administrative agencies
should not do so when they exercise legislative functions which the
Congress has delegated to them. ' 20 In addition to providing fair treat-
ment of the interested public, this right of prior participation should
promote public acceptance of agency rules.21
Apart from consideration of fairness and public acceptance, Con-
gress also intended to promote more accurate lawmaking through the
rulemaking process: valuable information can be gained from the pub-
lic sector affected by agency action. As noted in the Senate Judiciary
Committee report of the Administrative Procedure Act, "[agency]
knowledge is rarely complete, and it must always learn the. . . view-
points of those whom its regulations will affect. . . . [P]ublic participa-
19. See S. REP. No. 752 app. at 39.
20. APA LEG. HISTORY 359. The Senate Judiciary Committee Reports also emphasized that
the "minimum requirement" of participation by the interested public was based on the "premise
stated as follows by the Attorney General's Committee. . . : 'An administrative agency. . . is
not ordinarily a representative body .... Its deliberations are not carried on in public and its
members are not subject to direct political controls as are legislators.'" Id 19-20 (quoting ATr'y
GENERAL'S REP. 101-02).
21. For example, one court, faced with a challenge to the validity of an agency rule promul-
gated without rulemaking procedures, commented that "a meaningful prepublication dialogue
between plaintiffs and the [agency] may have even avoided this lawsuit." Kelley v. United States
Dep't of the Interior, 339 F. Supp. 1095, 1102 (E.D. Cal. 1972). See also APA LEG. HIsTORY 20.
The Attorney General's Report, which significantly influenced Congress' drafting of the APA,
emphasized that while a reason for an "[agency's] existence is that it is expected to bring to its task
greater familiarity with the subject than legislators, dealing with many subjects, can have, ...
[agency procedures still] should be adapted to giving adequate opportunity to all persons affected
to present their views, the facts within their knowledge, and the dangers and benefits of alternative
courses." AT'rY GENERAL'S REP. 102.
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tion . . . in the rule-making process is essential in order to permit
administrative agencies to inform themselves." 22
Congress clearly contemplated that, since the agency had educated
itself through this broad-based rulemaking process, the reviewing
courts would give the resulting rule considerable deference. 23 When
this process breaks down, and rules are developed instead by agency
adjudications, courts may be more liberal in upholding or striking
down the rules according to their own views, and bad law may result.
Neither the agency nor the court is likely to possess the knowledge and
expertise necessary to evaluate new standards without the education of
the rulemaking process. Accordingly, Justice Harlan advocated that
federal courts refuse to pass on the validity of new standards "until [the
agency] has first illumined the regulatory problems involved through
an appropriate exercise of its rule-making powers." 24
Fortunately, the courts are increasingly sensitive to the congres-
sional goals of fairness to the public and education of the agency
through the Administrative Procedure Act's notice and comment re-
quirements. In setting aside an agency action because of its failure to
provide these procedures to the industry affected by the action, one
court stated:
The interchange of ideas between the government and its citizenry
provides a broader base for intelligent decision-making and pro-
motes greater responsiveness to the needs of the people, especially in
22. APA LEG. HISTORY 20 (quoting AT'VY GENERAL'S REP. 102-03).
23. Congress, in section 10(e) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976), authorizes judicial
review of the substance of agency adjudications-at least to the extent of determining if the
agency findings are based on "substantial evidence." No such review of substance is provided for
agency findings developed by the rulemaking process.
24. California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 379 U.S. 366, 372 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
To check the soundness of rules developed by the NLRB and the courts through adjudication,
rather than through rulemaking, Professor Bernstein evaluated the "Fibreboard rule." This stan-
dard, developed out of agency adjudication and Supreme Court review thereof, is that "an em-
ployer contemplating the subcontracting of work being performed by employees represented by a
union has the obligation, under. . . the National Labor Relations Act, to bargain over [the merits
of] the subcontracting decision itself and not merely over its effect upon the employees involved."
Bernstein, supra note 1, at 579. The Board offered the following statement in support of this
bargaining requirement: "Experience has shown, however, that candid discussion of mutual
problems by labor and management frequently results in their resolution with attendant benefit to
both sides. Business operations may profitably continue and jobs may be preserved." Fibreboard
Paper Prods., Corp., 138 NLRB Dec. 550, 551 (1962) (quoting Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136
NLRB Dec. 1022, 1027 (1962)), reprinted in Bernstein, supra note 1, at 579. Professor Bernstein
circulated a questionnaire among labor and management regarding the value of the Fibreboard
rule. The result indicated that the NLRB had required labor and management to indulge in a
charade, that the bargaining requirement had no practical value. A typical response said: "[W]e
just go through the pretense of bargaining. It means more lawyers' fees, but it makes no difference
in the end." Id. 580. Professor Bernstein concluded that "an enormous number of Board doc-
trines are based upon untested suppositions." Id 582.
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cases such as this where Congress has only roughed in its program.
Indeed, a meaningful pre-publication dialogue ... may have even
avoided this lawsuit.25
The courts, however, have failed to recognize that these proce-
dures are the exclusive process for developing law and policy, and that
Congress deliberately precluded the agencies from using adjudica-
tion-which does not provide broad-based public input-to formulate
rules. Nevertheless, careful attention to the text of the Administrative
Procedure Act, and an examination of the relevant legislative history,
shows that Congress purposefully integrated the various provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act to make notice and comment proce-
dures mandatory. When an agency action constitutes "rulemaking,"
section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act requires notice to inter-
ested parties and an opportunity for them to comment. Section 4 is
mandatory: an agency "shall" give notice of "proposed rule making"
and the agency "shall give interested parties an opportunity to partici-
pate in the rule making. ' 26 Since these "notice and comment" proce-
dures are mandatory for "rulemaking," it is necessary to define this
term in order to determine the realm of agency action subject to these
procedures.
"Rulemaking" is the "agency process for formulating, amending,
or repealing a rule."27 The Administrative Procedure Act defines a
"rule" to encompass an agency's lawmaking and policymaking func-
tions: a "rule" is a "statement of general or particular applicability and
future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or pol-
icy. ... ,"28 In essence, a rule is a legal standard to be applied prospec-
tively to a class.29 The inclusion of the inapt phrase, "of. . .particular
applicability," is simply to denote that a class can be small and can
consist of named parties.30 "Rulemaking," then, is the development of
standards of general applicability, that is, "rules." "Adjudication," on
the other hand, is defined as the process for formulating an "order," 31
and, whatever the vagaries of the Administrative Procedure Act's defi-
25. Tasty Baking Co. v. Cost of Living Council, 395 F. Supp. 1367, 1389 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Kelley v. United States Dep't of Interior, 339 F. Supp. 1095, 1102 (E.D. Cal. 1972). See also
Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (1976) (emphasis added) (quoted at notes 13 & 14 supra).
27. APA § 2(c), 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1976) (emphasis added).
28. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976).
29. With respect to the impact of a rule on a class, the Attorney General's Report makes this
distinction between rules and adjudications: "[R]ules do not determine the rights of specific liti-
gants, but, like statutes, are addressed to people generally." Ar'Y GENERAL's REP. 12.
30. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:3 (2d ed. 1979).
31. APA § 2(d), 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (1976).
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nition of "order," 32 Congress clearly indicated that "[t]he term 'order' is
essentially and necessarily defined to exclude rules. 33
Thus, the Administrative Procedure Act defines "rulemaking" in
terms requiring notice and comment procedures for formulating law or
policy, while excluding adjudicatory procedures. This construction of
the statute is supported by the committee reports on the Administrative
Procedures Act. The Senate report states that the "definition of 'rule'
.. . prescribes the kind of operation that is subject to section 4
[rulemaking] rather than section 5 [adjudication]." 34 Similarly, the
House report states that the "definition [of a rule] is important because
it determines whether section 4 rather than section 5 applies to a regu-
latory operation. '35
Congress, therefore, purposefully integrated the various provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act to make section 4 rulemaking pro-
cedures an exclusive method of developing law and policy. A problem
of application is that this scheme requires the sometimes difficult task
of determining whether agency action constitutes a "rule"--prospective
action having a "substantial impact" on the "rights or obligations" of a
class of people or an industry36-- or an "order"-an ad hoc determina-
tion of the consequence of individual conduct affecting only the parties
to the proceeding. 37
B. Rule Promulgation. Cod/fcation and Publication.
In addition to prescribing procedures for agency formulation of
law and policy, Congress also imposed codification and publication re-
quirements in order to make the substance of agency-developed law
and policy more accessible38 and to create a greater consistency in
agency application of this law and policy.39 The ad hoc development
32. Under APA section 2(d), "'order' means the whole or a part of a final disposition. . . of
an agency in a matter other than rule making. . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1976).
33. H. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1946), reprinted in [1946] U.S. CODE CONO.
SERV. 1195; see S. REP. No. 752 at 11.
34. S. REP. No. 752 at 11.
35. H. REP. No. 1980, supra note 33, at 20.
36. See text accompanying notes 115-33 infra.
37. Agency adjudication involves the resolution of "disputed facts, in particular cases."
United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 245 (1973); see S. REP. No. 752 at 39.
38. E.g., APA LEo. HISTORY 15 ("an important and far-reaching defect in the field of public
administration has been a simple lack of adequate public information concerning its substance
and procedure").
39. The APA's codification and publication requirements are intended to avoid "the inher-
ently arbitrary nature of unpublished ad hoc determinations." Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232
(1974); see United States ex rel Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976, 985-86 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (quot-
ing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. at 232).
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of standards by adjudication is inconsistent with these purposes. Thus,
on this additional basis, adjudication is an improper substitute for
rulemaking.
Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act requires that agen-
cies, in the exercise of the lawmaking authority delegated to them by
Congress, must develop codified rules. These rules must then be pub-
lished in the Federal Register at least thirty days prior to their effective
date.40 Finally, section 3(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act pro-
vides that no person will have "to resort to, or be adversely affected by,
a matter required to be published in the Federal Register and not so
published."'41
These codification and publication requirements promote clarity
by avoiding the uncertainties, delays, and costs to the public of ascer-
taining the law from the welter and mass of agency adjudicatory opin-
ions. One commentator's discussion of the National Labor Relations
Board's "contract bar rule," a rule developed through adjudication, il-
lustrates the difficulties produced by an agency's failure to follow the
codification and publication requirements. The rule was perhaps intel-
ligible for "anyone who has the time to put together all the cases in
which different branches of the rule may be found, [and] to check all
the recent decisions to make sure that nothing has changed," 42 but for
the most part "even experienced practitioners may be hard put to state
...[such a] rule accurately. '43 Of course, it seems unfair to put inter-
ested parties to the expense of hiring a lawyer merely to state the rule.
Requiring an agency to codify its law would alleviate such problems.
The codification and publication requirements of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, however, accomplish more than clarification of the
law. Published rules bind the agency as well as the public.44 Thus,
they achieve a greater uniformity and consistency in the application of
the law than is possible when law is developed by the ad hoc process of
adjudication. Indeed, experience has shown that lawmaking by adjudi-
cation lends itself to a certain arbitrariness, if not dissemblance, in the
application of law by agencies. In one instance, a change in Federal
40. APA § 4(c), 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1976).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976).
42. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 941.
43. Id The burden of determining the substance of standards developed by adjudication also
falls heavily on both the agencies and the courts. As one court wishfully noted with respect to
NLRB practice, "[wihat would truly ease the administrative problem both for the Board and for
the courts would be for the Board to use its long neglected rule-making power to specify what a
union authorization card should say and how." Bryant Chucking Grinder Co. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d
565, 570 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 908 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
44. See, eg., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694-96 (1974).
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Communications Commission policy was
slipped into an opinion in such a way that only careful readers would
even know what had happened, without articulation of reasons, and
with the prior authorities not overruled, so that the opinion writers
remained free to pull them out of the drawer whenever the agency
wishes to reach a result supported by the old rule but not the new.45
The Federal Communications Commission, however, in a more
enlightened decision, refused to subject members of the broadcast in-
dustry to the vagaries of agency application of uncertain case law.46
The substantive issue was whether a corporation could be represented
by its own officers, rather than legal counsel, before the Federal Com-
munications Commission Review Board. The Federal Communica-
tions Commission contended that "commission precedent" had
established a rule allowing only attorneys to represent corporations.
The Review Board recognized both that the Commission could formu-
late such a rule and that there were sound policy reasons for doing so.
It found, however, that this "rule" was invalid on procedural grounds
because it had not been published as required by section 3 and 4 of the
Administrative Procedure Act. The Board noted that an uncertain case
law could not substitute for published rules and "[w]hether a corpora-
tion must be represented by counsel is a matter too fundamental, too
general in applicability. . . to be made the subject of an ad hoc rule
applicable when remembered. .... -47
Similarly, the federal courts have recently imported a new vitality
to the Administrative Procedure Act's codification and publication re-
quirements. A major Supreme Court decision, Morton v. Ruiz, 48 over-
turned an ad hoc agency determination of eligibility for government
benefits because the Bureau of Indian Affairs failed to codify and pub-
lish its standards of eligibility. The Court held that the agency should
have promulgated rules to "fill any gap" in its broad congressional del-
egation of authority. Because the agency had proceeded instead on an
ad hoc basis, the resulting standards were invalid. The Court empha-
sized that regardless of the substantive correctness of those determina-
tions, they were invalid because "the agency must, at a minimum, let
the standard be generally known so as to insure that it is being applied
consistently and so as to avoid both the reality and the appearance of
arbitrary denial of benefits to potential beneficiaries." 49 Regarding ar-
bitrariness, the Court found that "[t]he Administrative Procedure Act
45. H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 63 (1962).
46. Advanced Electronics, 21 F.C.C.2d 239 (1970).
47. Id at 244.
48. 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
49. Id at 231.
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was adopted to provide, inter alia, that administrative procedures af-
fecting individual rights and obligations be promulgated pursuant to
certain stated procedures so as to avoid the inherently arbitrary nature
of unpublished adhoc determinations." 50
C. Agency Implementation of Rulemaking.
1. Agency Discretion. Recognizing a need for procedural flex-
ibility in agency development of law and policy, Congress established
the minimal requirements of notice to and opportunity to comment by
the interested public, and of codified and published standards. Other-
wise, Congress left to the agencies the discretion to utilize additional
procedures. This concept is explained by the Senate report:
This subsection states... the minimum requirements of public
rule making procedure short of statutory hearing. Under it agencies
might in addition confer with industry advisory committees, consult
organizations, hold informal "hearing," and the like. Considerations
of practicality, necessity, and public interest ... will naturally gov-
ern the agency's determination of the extent to which public proceed-
ings should go. Matters of great import, or those where the public
submission of facts will be either useful to -the agency or a protection
to the public, should naturally be accorded more elaborate public
procedures.:51
The Supreme Court recently emphasized Congress' belief that the
Act is a statement of minimum essential rights and procedures in
rulemaking and that "[a]gencies are free to grant additional procedural
rights in the exercise of their discretion ....*"52 It would appear,
therefore, that while the agencies enjoy discretion to utilize additional
procedures beyond basic "notice and comment," they do not have dis-
cretion to avoid, by adjudication or otherwise, those procedures that
Congress deemed essential to exercising the lawmaking functions dele-
50. Id at 232. See also United States ex rel. Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976, 985-86 (E.D.
Pa. 1977). Moreover, there are constitutional overtones; in Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th
Cir. 1964), the court found that ad hoc application of standards by adjudication, in connection
with a municipality's liquor licensing, led to such arbitrariness in granting licenses as to violate
equal protection. Accord, United States v. Cook, 445 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1971):
If the Selective Service intends to prosecute young men for failure to perform their obli-
gation to perform civilian service, we think, in the light of due process requirements, the
Selective Service System must adopt well defined administrative rules and regulations
which articulate the standards of required performance and provide for appropriate no-
tice of violations of those standards.
Id at 890-91; Board of Pharmacy v. Cohen, 448 Pa. 189, 200-02, 292 A.2d 277, 283-84 (1972).
51. S. REP. No. 752 at 14-15. Accord, H.R. REP. No. 1980, supra note 33, at 16-17 ("The bill
is an outline of minimum essential rights and procedures.... It affords private parties a means
of knowing what their rights are and how they may protect them").
52. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 524 (1978).
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gated to agencies.
2. Enhancement of Agency Effectiveness. Studies of agency
practice since the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act have
confirmed Congress' original conclusions that law and policy should be
developed by the rulemaking process.5 3 For example, the narrowness
of the issues in adjudication, concentrated on the problems of the indi-
vidual litigant, can preclude the overview of an industry necessary to
establish suitable industry-wide standards. The Third Circuit has ob-
served that rational decisionmaking concerning industry standards is
not furthered by an agency losing "itself in an excursion into detail that
too often obscures fundamental issues rather than clarifies them." 54
Moreover, expanding adjudicatory proceedings to allow participation
by interested parties, even in an attempt to gain a broader perspective,
results in inordinately lengthy and unmanageable proceedings. Thus,
adjudicatory procedures have proven too cumbersome to entertain the
wide variety of views necessary for the development of policy.5 5 The
courts, and some agencies, have realized that rulemaking procedure,
with its greater flexibility and efficiency, "opens up the process of
agency policy innovation to a broad range of criticism, advice and data
that is ordinarily less likely to be forthcoming in adjudication." 56
Another advantage to the rulemaking process is reduced litigation.
By providing clearer standards to the affected industry or public, the
codification and publication requirements tend to induce a greater
compliance with these standards, without resort to litigation. Professor
Davis, referring to "trade regulation rules" issued by the Federal Trade
Commission, observed:
[A] single rule can sometimes have more effect on business practices
than a hundred cease and desist orders. The fundamental is that
nearly all businessmen will normally comply with law they under-
stand. Spending a few hundred thousand of taxpayers' dollars for an
order against a single company ... might not pass any test concern-
ing cost effectiveness . . . , but a trade regulation rule can declare
53. The general topic of advantages of rulemaking over adjudication has been examined in
depth in other commentaries, see authorities cited in note 1 supra.
54. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250, 1266-67 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1026
(1975). See also Pacific Coast European Conference v. United States, 350 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 958 (1965).
55. Adjudicatory hearings become "totally unmanageable" when subjected to the broad pub-
lic participation necessary for the development of policy. See Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 503 F.2d
1250, 1266 (3d Cir. 1974). For examples of the impracticability of industry-wide participation in
adjudicatory proceedings, see W. GELLHORN & C. BysE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES & COM-
MENTs 733-35 (6th ed. 1974).
56. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
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such a practice unlawful, can apply to all and not just to a single
respondent, and costs far less than a cease and desist order.
5 7
Despite this general recognition of the superiority of rulemaking,
the use of adjudication as a means of developing law and policy is not
without its proponents. The Supreme Court, for example, has stated
that an agency could choose to "proceed with caution, developing its
standards in a case-by-case manner. s58 But a case-by-case process may
result in an excessive particularization that precludes analysis of a
problem as it relates to an industry as a whole and inhibits develop-
ment of sound, clear standards. Perhaps the ultimate apology for the
agency use of adjudication to develop law and policy is that "this is
how the courts do it." One court, for instance, while observing that
"some of the problems that arise in academia might better be addressed
by rulemaking than by ad hoc case-by-case determination," 59 neverthe-
less approved the ad hoc practice, noting that it was "consistent with
the common law method. '60 What the court ignored, of course, was
that Congress had provided a substitute for this "common law
method." The Supreme Court, in a case arising prior to the enactment
of the Administrative Procedure Act, reasoned that
[s]ince the [Securities and Exchange] Commission, unlike a court,
does have the ability to make new law prospectively through the ex-
ercise of its rule-making powers, it has less reason to rely upon ad
hoc adjudication to formulate new standards of conduct .... The
function of filling in the interstices of the Act should be performed,
as much as possible, through this quasi-legislative promulgation of
rules to be applied in the future.
6
'
Congress, by the Administrative Procedure Act, made this policy pref-
erence for rulemaking a part of statutory law.
III. AN OBFUSCATION OF THE MANDATE
The rather clear requirement of rulemaking procedures has unfor-
tunately been obscured by a series of Supreme Court decisions that are
widely cited for the view that the Administrative Procedure Act, by
providing both rulemaking and adjudicatory provisions, provides the
57. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 6.18, at 292-93 (1st ed. Supp. 1970). See
generally Bernstein, supra note 1, at 592. The FTC itself has emphasized that rulemaking by
adjudication is a "prohibitively time-consuming, costly, and inefficient method of dealing with a
problem common to an entire industry." FTC, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of
Cigarettes in Relation to. the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8368 (1964) (State-
ment of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule).
58. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974).
59. Trustees of Boston Univ. v. NLRB, 575 F.2d 301, 305 (lst Cir.),petitionfor cert.filed, 47
U.S.L.W. 3097 (U.S. July 11, 1978) (No. 78-67).
60. 575 F.2d at 305.
61. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
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agency with the discretion to choose between these procedures for the
development of law and policy.6 2 The opinion widely thought to be
bedrock for such agency discretion is that of the Supreme Court in SEC
v. Chenery.63 This, however, is not a proper reading of that case.
The usual view of Chenery rests on that Court's position that while
an agency should ordinarily develop standards of conduct "through
[the] quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the fu-
ture,"64 an agency may nevertheless proceed retroactively by adjudica-
tion to find past conduct illegal, even though such conduct has not been
identified as illegal by an agency rule.6 5 This position, however, must
be considered in context. First, the Court was not interpreting or ap-
plying the Administrative Procedure Act; the agency action in question
had occurred prior to the enactment of this statute. Indeed, the Court
made no reference to the then newly enacted Administrative Procedure
Act. Second, the Court's attention in Chenery was not directed to the
problem of how policy should be formulated. Instead, the Court was
concerned with the retroactive application of new standards of conduct.
The Chenery case involved a Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion decision pursuant to a statute directing it to approve reorganiza-
tion of public utility holding companies only when the reorganization
was "fair and equitable to the persons affected."' 66 The Securities and
Exchange Commission refused to approve a reorganization plan for a
utility company unless management personnel sold the company stock
that they had purchased during the reorganization. According to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, this stock ownership created a
conflict of interest on the part of management, which was detimental to
the corporation's shareholders. Management objected that such
purchases were not illegal at the time of purchase; they contended that
the Securities and Exchange Commission's new standard could not be
retroactively applied to them-that it could only be "prospectively ap-
plied."67
The issue in Chenery, then, was retroactivity: could the Securities
and Exchange Commission condemn activity that was not illegal at the
62. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 394
U.S. 759 (1969); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
63. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
64. Id at 202.
65. Id at 202-03.
66. Public Utility Act of 1935, § I1(e), 15 U.S.C. § 79(k) (1976).
67. The Court summarized management's argument: "[T]he Commission would be free only
to promulgate a general rule outlawing such profits in future utility reorganizations; but such a
rule would have to be prospective in nature and have no retroactive effect upon the instant situa-
tion." 332 U.S. at 199-200.
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time it was performed? The adjudication vis-a-vis rulemaking question
was raised because adjudication is typically retroactive in effect, involv-
ing judgments concerning past conduct, while rulemaking prospec-
tively defines illegal conduct. The Court, therefore, was not confronted
with the issue of the appropriate procedural method for formulating
standards, nor was it concerned with the relevant Administrative Pro-
cedure Act requirements. Properly viewed, Chenery relates to the pro-
cedure issue only by dictum that expresses a general preference for
rulemaking-a preference made law by the Administrative Procedure
Act.68
This perception of the Administrative Procedure Act was subse-
quently accepted by a majority of the Court in NLRB v. Wyman-
Gordon Co. 69 However, a plurality of four in that opinion opted for a
result that caused new confusion. Wyman-Gordon involved an attempt
by the National Labor Relations Board to develop a rule of general
application by adjudicatory procedures. Two employers had mailed
antiunion material to their employees during the course of an election
for union representation. The unions then asked the employers to fur-
nish them with the names and addresses of those employees so that
they could distribute rebuttal information. The employers refused. In
the course of adjudication as to the propriety of the employers' action,
the National Labor Relations Board has invited "certain interested par-
ties to file briefs and to participate in oral arguments. '70 At the end of
the adjudicatory proceedings against these employers, the National La-
bor Relations Board announced a new standard, the "Excelsior
Rule,"' 7' which was to apply prospectively "in all election cases."
Under this standard, employers must provide a list of employee names
and addresses to the National Labor Relations Board who will then
make the list available to all parties to the election.
The Wyman-Gordon Company challenged the application of the
Excelsior Rule to its particular case on the ground that the rule had not
been formulated according to the rulemaking process of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. On review, the Supreme Court first noted that
the Excelsior standard was, in fact, a rule enacted without meeting the
rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. In par-
ticular, the National Labor Relations Board's invitation to selected par-
ties to intervene did not satisfy the requirement of notice to, and
68. Id at 202. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
69. 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
70. Id at 763.
71. The Excelsior Rule had been promulgated originally in an earlier adjudicative proceed-
ing, Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
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opportunity to comment by, all interested parties. The National Labor
Relations Board, however, argued that it had discretion to promulgate
new rules in adjudicatory proceedings. Six of the Justices rejected this
argument. Justice Fortas, for the plurality of four, stated:
The rule-making provisions of that Act [APA], which the Board
would avoid, were designed to assure fairness and a mature consider-
ation of rules of general application. . . .They may not be avoided
by the process of making rules in the course of adjudicatory proceed-
ings.72
The Court recognized that policy might be formulated in an adju-
dicatory proceeding, but that such policy was to be applied only to the
parties to that proceeding. The plurality did recognize that the result of
an adjudication may serve to guide the "direction" an agency might
take in the future.73 However, these recognized functions of adjudica-
tion did not justify the use of such a proceeding to develop standards
that would affect substantially a large segment of the public.74 As Jus-
tices Douglas and Harlan pointed out, the Excelsior Rule was not "par-
ticularized to special facts"; rather, it was designed "to fit all cases at all
times. ' 75 Rulemaking procedures therefore were necessary.
Unfortunately, the plurality, while finding the National Labor Re-
lation Board's procedures invalid, upheld the rule. Apparently, the
plurality felt that the rule was substantively correct; therefore, a re-
mand for new proceedings to reformulate it would be "meaningless. ' 76
But as Justice Harlan argued, how could the Court presume to assess
the merits of the rule when the Board had not "recanvass[ed] all of the
competing considerations" 77 in a rulemaking proceeding. The three re-
maining Justices concurred with the plurality's approval of the Excel-
72. 394 U.S. at 764.
73. Id at 765-66. The plurality's statement concerning the limited role of adjudication in the
formulation of policy-policy as "applied and announced therein"-seems to indicate that an
agency may, in appropriate circumstances, apply a statute directly without first implementing it by
rules. Such circumstances might be that the statute is precise enough to be applied without imple-
mentation by rules, that in enforcing a statute an agency did not foresee a certain problem, or that
the conduct in question is rare and isolated. In such cases the public interest may require that the
statute be directly applied by adjudication. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201-03
(1947). This authority, however, does not indicate that the agency can generalize the result of the
adjudication and apply it to a segment of the public without complying with the rulemaking proc-
ess.
74. Wyman-Gordon has been cited for the assertion that "it is well established that agencies
may articulate policies, interpret rules, and develop guidelines in the course of adjudication pro-
ceedings, so long as adjudication is not used as a substitute for substantive, legislative rulemak-
ing." Human Resources Management, Inc. v. Weaver, 442 F. Supp. 241, 251 (D.D.C. 1978).
75. 394 U.S. at 777.
76. Id at 766 n.6. The two dissenting Justices and the three concurring Justices all disagreed;
they believed strongly that a procedurally invalid agency action could not be upheld.
77. Id at 783.
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sior Rule, but this concurrence was based on their belief that the
Administrative Procedure Act gave an agency the discretion to use ei-
ther adjudicatory or rulemaking procedures as the means of formulat-
ing a rule.78 As a result, the case is often taken to support such
discretion.
In sum, Justice Fortas' opinion tried to recognize the rulemaking
process as the exclusive means for developing agency policy, but be-
cause the plurality upheld the rule despite its procedural deficiencies,
the case proved to be less than dispositive.
The rulemaking vis-a-vis adjudication problem again came before
the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Be#lAerospace Co. 79 The federal labor
laws contain no provision expressly exempting "managerial employ-
ees" from their coverage. Nevertheless, prior to 1970, the National La-
bor Relations Board had never certified a bargaining unit consisting of
managerial employees, and the Board had indicated that such employ-
ees were not subject to the labor laws.80 In 1970, the Board changed its
position and, in an adjudicatory proceeding, announced that these laws
applied to all management employees except those who might be
placed in "conflict of interest situations" because of competing man-
agement and union interests.81 The Second Circuit, however, over-
turned the Board's action. The court thought that this new standard
should be formulated by rulemaking procedures, rather than the adju-
dicatory procedures used by the Board. Judge Friendly, writing for the
court, stated that "if the. . . opinions of six justices in Wyman-Gordon
are to mean anything, they must be read as demanding rule-making
here."82
On review, the Supreme Court disagreed. First the court revised
the content of the Board's new standard. It found that Congress in-
tended that all "managerial employees"-those who "formulate and ef-
fectuate management policies" and not just those in the more limited
conflict of interest situation posited by the Board-were excluded from
the protections of the labor laws.83 The Court remanded the case for
the Board to determine whether the buyers were managerial employees
according to this standard. On the issue of which procedures should be
used by the Board in assessing the status of the buyers in question,
however, the Supreme Court held that the Board could apply this cor-
78. Id at 772.
79. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
80. Id at 275.
81. Id at 272.
82. 475 F.2d 485, 496 (2d Cir. 1973), a 'd inpart and rev'd inpart, 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
83. 416 U.S. at 288.
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rected standard of "managerial employees" in an adjudicatory pro-
ceeding-without resort to rulemaking.8 4 This result is not necessarily
inconsistent with the rulemaking requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act. If, on remand, the Board's task was simply that of ap-
plying a legal standard to the twenty-five buyers, then the Board would
not be formulating standards of general applicability; thus rulemaking
would not be required by the Administrative Procedure Act. Accord-
ing to Judge Skelly Wright's reading of the opinion, the Supreme Court
had thus "reserved the question whether the Board would have to use
rulemaking to adopt a new standard of general applicability. ' a5
The Court's treatment of the rulemaking problem in Bell Aero-
space, however, is questionable. The problem is the manner in which
the "managerial employee" standard initially developed. The Board
had formulated the standard by adjudicatory processes, and the
Supreme Court on review revised the standard in accordance with its
own views. Missing from this process was any notice to or opportunity
to comment by labor and management at large, and the attendant abil-
ity to "recanvass all of the competing considerations. ' 86 Judge
Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit, thought that rulemaking was
necessary:
The Board was prescribing a new policy, not just with respect to 25
buyers in Wheatfield, N.Y., but in substance. . . "to fit all cases at
all times." There must be tens of thousands of manufacturing,
wholesale and retail units which employ buyers, and hundreds of
thousands of the latter. Yet the Board did not even attempt to in-
form industry and labor organizations ... of its proposed new pol-
icy and to invite comment thereon .... 87
The Supreme Court in Bell Aerospace may have addressed ob-
84. The Court discussed the rulemaking issue in the following context:
The question is not whether the Board should have resorted to rulemaking, or in fact
improperly promulgated a "rule" when in the context of the prior representation pro-
ceeding it held that the Act covers all "managerial employees" except those meeting the
new "conflict of interest in labor relations" touchstone. Our conclusion that the Board
applied the wrong legal standard makes consideration of that issue unnecessary. Rather,
the present question is whether on remand the Board must invoke its rulemaking proce-
dures if it determines in light of our opinion, that these buyers are not "managerial
employees".
Id at 291-92.
85. Judge Wright's full statement was that
in BellAerospace the Court held merely that in deciding whether the buyers who worked
for aparicular employer were managerial employees the NLRB was free to proceed by
adjudication. The Court expressly reserved the question whether the Board would have
to use rule making to adopt a new general standard for determining when an employee is
a managerial employee.
Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 390 (D.C. Cir.) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted), cer. de.
nied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
86. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 783 (1963).
87. 475 F.2d at 496.
[Vol. 1980:103
Vol. 1980:103] RULEMAKING VERSUS ADJUDIC4TION 121
liquely the matter of the elimination of the rulemaking process in the
initial formulation of the managerial employee standard. Although it
first stated that the problem before it was the application of an already
established standard to the twenty-five buyers in question, the Court, in
a more expansive vein, cited Chenery and Wyman-Gordon for the prop-
osition that "the Board is not precluded from announcing new princi-
ples in an adjudicative proceeding and ... the choice between
rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board's
discretion. s88 These words encourage a broad interpretation that the
Board could reverse its position and declare that all buyers are mana-
gerial employees without resort to rulemaking. Because of such re-
marks, the Bell Aerospace opinion is now widely cited for the
proposition that agencies can develop rules by adjudication.8 9 More
limited and more careful readings of the opinion, such as that of Judge
Skelly Wright,90 are rare.
The Supreme Court itself, however, in a decision rendered in the
same term as Bell Aerospace, indicated that agency development of
new principles and standards must be by the rulemaking process. In
Morton v. Ruiz,91 the Court overturned an ad hoc determination of
ineligibility for federal funds because the agency had not established
and published the eligibility standards in accordance with the rulemak-
ing process of the Administrative Procedure Act. Adjudication, as a
means of developing new standards, necessarily involves the "ad hoe"
decisionmaking and uncodified standards that the Court disfavored in
Ruiz. Therefore, to read BellAerospace as approving the ad hoc devel-
opment of rules is to have the Court advancing in different directions
on the same problem within the same term. Moreover, the mandate of
Congress is controlling, and Congress has clearly made the rulemaking
process mandatory for the development of new standards. Accord-
ingly, the better view of the Supreme Court's position follows this con-
gressional mandate: the Court in Chenery stated a policy preference
for rulemaking, and then later in Wyman-Gordon and Ruiz recognized
the mandatory directive of Congress on this point. BellAerospace may
be somewhat out of line, but it is not necessarily a statement that an
agency can formulate new standards by adjudication rather than
rulemaking.
88. 416 U.S. at 294.
89. Eg., NLRB v. Children's Baptist Home, 576 F.2d 256, 260 (9th Cir. 1978); Giles Lowery
Stockyards v. Department of Agriculture, 565 F.2d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
957 (1978); Apex Oil Co. v. FEA, 443 F. Supp. 647, 655 & n.6 (D.D.C. 1977).
90. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
91. 415 U.S. 199 (1974). See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
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IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE RULEMAKING MANDATE
A. The "Substantive Rules" Approach.
The courts' reluctance to enforce rulemaking procedures can be
attributed largely to the difficulty in determining the sphere of agency
action for which such procedures are required.92 In the past, this prob-
lem was magnified by what now appears to be an unworkable and un-
necessary approach.
Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act lists two primary
exceptions to rulemaking: interpretive rules and general statements of
policy. 93 Congress wished to encourage these informational func-
tions,94 but, at the point that agency action becomes more than merely
information and affects the rights and obligations of the public, Con-
gress intended to guarantee a right of prior public participation.95 Ex-
cept for interpretive rules and policy statements, therefore, Congress
made notice and comment procedures mandatory for the general body
of rules.
Commentators and the courts nevertheless initially concluded that
Congress meant notice and comment procedures to be mandatory only
for certain kinds of rules---"substantive" rules.96 Section 553, on its
92. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 610; Shapiro, supra note 1, at 924.
93. APA § 4(a), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976).
Neither "interpretive rules" nor "general statements of policy" are defined by the APA. In-
terpretive rules are considered to be public statements of the agencies' view of the meaning of
"statutory language" or of other rules and regulations. See ATr'Y GENERAL'S REP. 27. See Bon-
field, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Particoation in the Making of Interpretive Rules and Gen-
eralStatements ofPolicy Under the A.P.A., 23 AD. L. REv. 101, 108 (1971). "General statements
of policy" serve the function of informing the agency staff; they are "rules directed primarily at the
staff of an agency describing how it will conduct agency discretionary functions, while other rules
are directed primarily at the public in an effort to impose obligations on them." Noel v. Chap-
man, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting Bonfield, supra at 117), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
824 (1976); see United States ex rel Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976, 984 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See
generally Bonfield, supra at 117.
For purposes of determining the applicability of rulemaking procedures, these interpretive
rules and general statements of policy exceptions are presently distinguished according to whether
they have a "substantial impact" on the "rights and obligations" of a segment of the public. If
there is such an effect, then these exceptions cannot be claimed and the rulemaking process cannot
be avoided. See text accompanying notes 115-17 & 130-33 infra.
94. "[l]t is desired to encourage the making of such rules." APA LEO. HISTORY 18. Never-
theless, the legislative history states that in situations in which rulemaking procedures are "useful"
to the agency or "helpful to the public," agencies should not use the interpretive rules or general
statements of policy exceptions to avoid rulemaking. S. REP. No. 752 at 14.
95. See text accompanying notes 116-17 & 130-33 infra.
96. Asimow, Public Partic#7ation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements,
75 MICH. L. REv. 520, 530 (1977); Warren, The Notice Requirement in Administrative Rulemaking
An Analysis of Legislative andInterpretive Rules, 29 AD. L. REv. 367, 369 (1977). See also Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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face, does not limit the rulemaking requirements to substantive rules;97
however, this limitation was imputed as consistent with the intent of
Congress.98 Instead of being consistent, however, this interpretation re-
sulted in a digression from congressional intent because of the defini-
tion of a substantive rule.
A substantive rule was understood to be a rule having "the force of
law":
A properly adopted substantive rule establishes a standard of con-
duct which has the force of law. In subsequent administrative pro-
ceedings involving a substantive rule, the issues are whether the
adjudicated facts conform to the rule and whether the rule should be
waived or applied in that particular instance. The underlying policy
embodied in the rule is not generally subject to challenge before the
agency.99
Unfortunately, the actual impact of the rule on the public was not nec-
essarily examined in determining whether a rule had the force of law.
Rather, the key determinants were whether Congress had authorized
an agency to make rules with the force of law and whether the agency
had characterized the rule in question as having the force of law.100
97. One court noted that the characterization as substantive was not very helpful and more-
over, that the "word 'substance' nowhere appears in section 4(a) [of the APA]." National Motor
Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90, 96 (D.D.C. 1967), q'dper curiam, 393
U.S. 18 (1968).
98. While the text of the APA does not limit notice and comment procedures to substantive
rules, it does refer to the necessity ofpublishing "substantive" rules. APA § 4(c), 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)
(1976). The import of this distinction is not clear from the legislative history. Perhaps Congress,
while it did not by the text of section 553 make "notice and comment" procedures applicable only
to "substantive rules," understood nevertheless that this would be the usual realm of rulemaking.
The Senate report states that public rule making procedures are required only for "substantive
rules, which involve true administrative legislation." APA LEG. HIsTORY 19. The problem,
though, has not been that notice and comment procedures may be available only for "substantive
rules"; rather, the problem has been the limited and unrealistic definition of substantive rules.
99. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Another aspect of the substantive rule approach was that the courts would not substitute their
views for that of the agency regarding the merits of a substantive rule. But in the case of a lesser
kind of rule, for example an interpretive rule, the courts might consider the merits of the rule de
novo. "While the legislative regulation [substantive rule], if intra vires, must be applied by the
courts, the interpretive regulation, being 'only an extrinsic aid in deciphering the meaning of an
ambiguous statute,' maybe refused judical recognition." Morgenthau, ImpliedRegulatory Powers
In Administrative Law, 28 IowA L. REv. 575, 582 (1943). See also Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder,
194 F.2d 329, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1952). The problem with this distinction is that it does not suffi-
ciently account for the practice of the courts, which often look to factors other than the substantive
rule-interpretive rule definitional scheme in assessing the deference to be given an agency rule.
Such factors include the expertise of the court with respect to the subject matter of the rule,
whether the rule is a longstanding one, whether the statute has been reenacted with the rule out-
standing, etc. The result is that so-called "interpretive rules" are often constructions of the law
with authority equal to that of substantive rules. See I K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA-
TISE, §§ 5.05-.07 (Ist ed. 1958).
100. For example, Professor Davis states that
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Some problems are readily apparent. First, with or without specific
congressional authority to make rules, an agency must interpret and
apply the statute under which it operates, an action often involving a
formulation of law and policy with significant effect on the public. Sec-
ond, an agency that has been given rulemaking authority may charac-
terize its action as something other than a rule with legal force even
though the action significantly affects the "rights and obligations" of
the public. In these situations, the impact of the agency action on the
public should raise the issue of the right of prior participation in the
formulation of the action provided by rulemaking procedures. The
substantive rule test, however, did not admit this kind of analysis.
To illustrate, in Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder'0' the agency had ini-
tially promulgated a regulation that "[f]ruit wine derived wholly...
from one kind of fruit shall be designated by the word 'wine' qualified
by the name of such fruit . . .,102 Later, the agency decided that
wine made from the boysenberry, a variety of a blackberry, could not
be labeled as blackberry wine. The Gibson Wine Company challenged
this decision on the basis that it amended an existing regulation, hence
requiring rulemaking procedures. The court, however, noted that the
agency had identified its action as merely an "interpretation" of an ex-
isting regulation; thus, the action did not have the force of law. Since
the action lacked the force of law, rulemaking procedures were not re-
quired. 0 3 According to the dissent, however, the question was not the
agency's characterization of its action; rather, it was whether the action
in fact deprived a boysenberry wine producer of a "valuable right,"
thereby raising the issue of prior participation in the agency decision.104
A more recent application of the "force of law" standard occurred
in Pacfc Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC.105 This case involved Federal
Power Commission attempts to curtail natural gas usage. Curtailment
[a] rule which the agency designates as interpretive and as 'merely declarative of the
Commission's view' is surely an interpretive rule. That § 4 of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act exempts 'interpretive rules' from its procedural requirements, coupled with the
Commission's omission of such procedures, contributes to the classification of rules as
interpretive.
K. DAvIs, supra note 57, § 5.03, at 249. See also Asimow, supra note 96, at 557 ("The traditional
test [of determining the applicability of rule making] relies to an unacceptable degree on the label
used by the agency").
101. 194 F.2d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
102. Id at 330.
103. Id at 331-32.
104. Id at 335 (Miller, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted that "the new ruling has the
force and effect of law, as far as the Gibson Wine Company and others similarly situated are
concerned," no matter how the agency characterized it. Id at 335-36. This view antedates the
more modern approach, discussed at notes 115-33 infra and accompanying text.
105. 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
[Vol. 1980:103
Vol. 1980:1031 RULEMAKING VERSUS ADJUDICATION 125
measures could be based either on the order of "contract commit-
ments" to customers or on the nature of the customer's "end use" of
gas. By a promulgation labeled a "Statement of Policy," the Commis-
sion announced that the curtailment was to be based on the "end use"
of the gas. This "Statement of Policy" was issued without prior notice
to, or comment by, the regulated industry. Consequently, customers
whose gas supplies were subject to curtailment sought to overturn it.
The court, however, found that the agency had not intended the state-
ment in question to have the "force of law." Accordingly, it was not a
"substantive rule" requiring rulemaking procedures. 10 6
The flaw in this decision is that the court ignored the real, immedi-
ate impact of the agency action. As stated by one commentator:
[The policy statement] had an immediate effect on all gas customers
who had contractual commitments for deliveries, but low [end use]
priorities, and who had every reason to take the FPC's pronounce-
ment seriously. The chance of obtaining a waiver in subsequent pro-
ceedings would have appeared to them to be extremely slight.
Consequently, low priority customers had to begin an immediate
search for alternative energy sources, to negotiate long-range com-
mitments for other fuels, and to purchase equipment for burning
them. 107
A more forthright approach would have been to recognize that the
Federal Power Commission had selected a gas curtailment policy likely
to have a substantial effect on existing contract rights of a segment of
the industry. The industry's right of prior participation in the formula-
tion of this policy would then have been in issue. 08
The artificial, unedifying substantive rule test was not the only
weakness in the court's decision. The court employed a curious sort of
bootstrapping in its adherence to the usual view that the Federal Power
Commission could develop rules by either adjudication or rulemak-
ing. 109 From this position, the court reasoned that
[a]lthough the Commission is free to initiate a rulemaking proceed-
ing to establish a binding substantive rule, the Commission appar-
106. The court first stated that rulemaking procedures applied only to substantive rules. Id at
37. It then defined a substantive rule as a rule having "the force of law." Id at 38. The court
concluded that the statement of policy did not have "the force of law," primarily because the
agency had characterized its action as one without "legal effect." In this respect, the court ex-
plained that "the stated purpose. . . was not to provide an inflexible binding rule." Id at 40-41.
107. Asimow, supra note 96, at 536-37.
108. If the FPC had wished to avoid rulemaking because of emergency conditions created by
the gas crisis, it could have done so pursuant to section 4(a) of the APA, which provides that
"notice and comment" procedures may be dispensed with "when the agency for good cause finds
(and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefore in the rules issued) that
notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976).
109. 506 F.2d at 38.
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ently intends to establish its curtailment policies by proceeding
through individual adjudications. Order No. 467 merely announces
the general policy which the Commission hopes to establish in subse-
quent proceedings.' 10
The court, therefore, thought a general statement of policy preferable
to springing a "secret policy" on the public by the "ad hoc" process of
adjudication.' Thus, the court acted as it did in large part to provide
a means of ameliorating the ill effects of developing law by adjudica-
tion. The fact remains, however, that the "policy statement" itself
would cause natural gas customers with existing contract commitments
to forego their contracts and look to alternative sources. Moreover, if
the rulemaking process had been recognized as the required means of
formulating policy, the "secret policy" problem that troubled the court
would have disappeared.
Another disturbing aspect of both the Gibson and Pacfic Gas cases
is the courts' assumption that because the agencies had characterized
their actions as having no legal effect, the courts could review those
actions de novo, and therefore, plenary judicial review would save the
parties from being prejudiced by the agency actions." 2 But this prem-
ise is a serious perversion of the agency-court partnership contemplated
by Congress. If the agency action had been imbued with a sense of
fairness and acceptability by prior public participation, perhaps the
"arduous" litigation would have been avoided in the first place." 3
More important, the court does not possess this presumed ability to
assess the underlying wisdom of the agency action. Congress intended
that law and policy be determined through agency expertise, assisted
and educated by the interested public. Congress did not intend that the
substantive basis of policy be determined de novo first by the court and
then in a proceeding in which only certain members of the affected
industry participate. Again, Justice Harlan's admonition is on point:
110. Id at 41.
Ill. Id
112. Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ("The District Court
treated the Deputy Commissioner's ruling as a mere expression of opinion, examined the whole
question on the merits de novo ab in1ita, made its own findings on the evidence before it, and
reached its own conclusions upon the merits"). Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 40
(D.C. Cir. 1974). The statements in Pacifc Gas are dictum, since that court contemplated review
of the substance of the policy statement at some later time, perhaps after this statement was ap-
plied in adjudication. But the court noted that the scope of this future review would be "broader
than the scope of review for a substantive rule," since a policy statement could be issued without
prior public participation. Id at 49.
113. "I do not understand why the Deputy Commissioner was so loath to grant [a hearing] in
this case. To do so would have been much less arduous and time-consuming than to engage in
this litigation." Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 336 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (Miller, J., dis-
senting).
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The "court should decline to pass upon these cases until the [agency]
has first illumined the regulatory problems involved through an appro-
priate exercise of its rule making powers."'"14
B. The "Substantial Impact"Approach.
Eventually, it became evident that the substantive rule test ob-
scured rather than clarified. The Second Circuit discarded the substan-
tive rule approach, stating, "[t]he label that the particular agency puts
upon its given exercise of administrative power is not, for our purposes,
conclusive; rather, it is what the agency does in fact.""t 5 Under the new
approach, if agency action significantly affects the "right or obliga-
tions" of a regulated industry or a segment of the public, then that ac-
tion should be put "to the test of prior examination and comment by
the affected parties."' 16 Such agency action satisfies the Administrative
Procedure Act's definition of a rule."X7
This "substantial impact" test originated in the Third Circuit's
1969 decision in Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Commission. 18 The
Federal Power Commission, without prior public participation, had
imposed a requirement of compound rather than simple rates of inter-
est on certain refunds. To avoid rulemaking procedures, the Federal
Power Commission characterized its action as a "policy statement."
However, the court set aside the agency action because of the Federal
Power Commission's failure to adhere to the rulemaking process:
[The rulemaking procedure] was enacted to give the public an
opportunity to participate in the rule-making process. It also enables
114. California v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 379 U.S. 366, 372 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See text accompanying note 24 supra.
115. Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 481-82 (2d Cir. 1972). This court, look-
ing to what "the Director in fact did," rejected the agency's characterization of its action and
imposed a rulemaking requirement where the action actually affected "existing rights and obliga-
tions" of a class. Id at 482. A similar approach was utilized by a three-judge court in the District
of Columbia Circuit: "The characterizations 'substantive' and 'procedural'-no more here than
elsewhere in the law-do not guide inexorably to the right result, nor do they really advance the
inquiry very far." National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90, 96
(D.D.C. 1967), aj'dper curiam, 393 U.S. 18 (1968).
116. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Department of Energy, 449 F. Supp. 760, 799 (D. Del. 1978)
(quoting National Helium Corp. v. FEA, 569 F.2d 1137, 1146 (Emer. Ct. App. 1978)), aff'd sub
nom. Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029 (Emer. Ct. App. 1978). In these
instances, the courts realize readily that Congress intended prior public participation: "[Tihe basic
policy [section 4 of the APA] requires that when a proposed regulation of general applicability has
a substantial impact on the regulated industry,. . . notice and opportunity for comment should
...be provided." American Ass'n of Councils of Medical Staffs v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp, 848,
857 (E.D. La. 1976) (quoting Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858, 863 (D. Del.
1970)).
117. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
118. 412 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969).
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the agency promulgating the rule to educate itself before establishing
rules and procedures which have a substantial impact on those regu-
lated. . . . These procedures must be followed when an agency is
exercising its legislative function .... 119
The impact on the regulated industry was evident: a higher interest
rate.
The decision in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association v.
Finch 120 illustrates the usefulness of analyzing the impact on the regu-
lated industry to determine whether prior notice and comment require-
ments apply. In 1962, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 12' was
amended to require that the "effectiveness" of new drugs be established
by "substantial evidence."' 22 A few years later, the Food and Drug
Administration, without prior public participation, issued regulations
prescribing standards for "adequate and well-controlled clinical inves-
tigations," which the Food and Drug Administration would consider
sufficient to establish "substantial evidence" of the "effectiveness" of
drugs.123 All other documented clinical evidence and clinical tests were
excluded as "irrelevant."'124 Characterizing this regulation as "inter-
pretive and procedural," the Food and Drug Administration contended
that it was exempt from rulemaking requirements. 125
The court, however, found that "a facile semantic distinction be-
tween an 'interpretive and procedural' rule on the one hand and a 'sub-
stantive' rule on the other does little to clarify whether the regulations
here involved are subject to the notice and comment provisions of Sec-
tion 4 . . , 26 Rather, the "basic purpose" of the Administrative
Procedure Act's rulemaking requirement considered in light of the
rule's "impact on the regulated industry" was the better approach. 27
Accordingly, the court found that the new regulation changed the evi-
dentiary standards relating to the removal of drugs from the market,
was "pervasive" in that it applied to more than 2,000 drug products,
and had an "immediate and substantial impact" on the way drug com-
panies conducted their "every day business."' 128 Also, the court noted
119. Id at 744 (emphasis added).
120. 307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970).
121. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976).
122. Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(d), 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1976)).
123. 21 C.F.R. § 130.12 (1970).
124. Id Moreover, should the FDA attempt to remove a drug from the market because of lack
of effectiveness, a drug company could obtain a hearing only if it demonstrated an ability to show
"substantial evidence" of the kind demanded by the regulation. 307 F. Supp. at 860.
125. 307 F. Supp. at 863.
126. Id
127. Id at 863.
128. Id at 864.
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that there was "considerable confusion" as to the substantive validity of
the regulation and that many questions had arisen that might be
avoided by the agency's educating itself through rulemaking proceed-
ings. 29
The viability of this "substantial impact" test is indicated by the
wide following that it has quickly gained among the courts. 30 Such
broad application indicates that this approach provides analysis suffi-
ciently precise to determine whether rulemaking is applicable. In this
respect, the "substantial impact" terminology is somewhat of an over-
simplification. This approach first involves a determination of whether
the effect of an agency action is sufficiently pervasive to be the legisla-
tive-like action for which Congress established rulemaking procedures.
Then the court must ask whether this action has a "palpable effect"' 31
or a "substantial impact" on the public or the industry subject to the
action. Sometimes the agency action clearly does not have a substan-
tial impact-for example, when the agency is merely clarifying existing
standards and not creating new ones.' 32 In close situations, courts
should look to the "touchstone" of congressional purposes, 33 such as
creating a sense of fairness and acceptability with respect to agency
standards, or usefully educating the agency by the rulemaking process.
129. The court stated that "the administrative procedures required by section 4. . .would at
the very least provide an opportunity for clarifying some of the difficult problems and matters
which, if unresolved, may impede effective enforcement of the Food and Drug Act." Id at 868.
130. In addition to the cases already noted, see National Helium Corp. v. FEA, 569 F.2d 1137,
1145-46 (Emer. Ct. App. 1978); Anderson v. Butz, 550 F.2d 459, 462-63 (9th Cir. 1977); Pickus v.
United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112-14 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Aiken v. Obledo, 442 F.
Supp. 628, 648-50 (E.D. Cal. 1977); Lewis v. Weinberger, 415 F. Supp. 652, 659-60 (D.N.M. 1976);
City of N.Y. v. Diamond, 35 Ad. L.2d 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n
v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 1967), aft'dper curiam, 393 U.S. 18 (1968). Not surpris-
ingly, the "substantial impact" approach is now used to define "substantive" for purposes of sec-
tion 4(c) of the APA, which requires publication of "substantive rules." This supplants the "legal
effects" test. The "substantial impact" approach, therefore, applies uniformly to the rule publica-
tion as well as the rule formulation parts of the APA. Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 42 Ad.
L.2d 819, 822 (4th Cir. 1977); St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. United States, 41 Ad. L.2d 461 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
131. National Helium Corp. v. FEA, 569 F.2d 1137, 1146 (Emer. Ct. App. 1978) ("When an
agency action has 'palpable effects' upon the regulated industry and the public in general, it is
necessary to expose that action 'to the test of prior examination and comment by the affected
parties' ") (quoting National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90, 96
(D.D.C. 1976), aj'dper curiam, 393 U.S. 18 (1968)).
132. E.g., American Ass'n of Councils of Medical Staffs v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 848 (E.D.
La. 1976).
133. The "touchstone.. .is the basic purpose" of Congress in establishing the rulemaking
process. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Department of Energy, 449 F. Supp. 760, 799 (D. Del. 1978),
aJf'dsub nom Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029 (Emer. Ct. App. 1978).
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C. An Importation of "Substantial Impact"Analysis to the
Rulemaking versus Adjudication Problems.
The courts developed this "substantial impact" approach prima-
rily to resolve problems of the applicability of rulemaking requirements
in situations in which agency action was characterized as an interpre-
tive rule or a statement of policy. The "outer boundaries" of the excep-
tions to the rulemaking requirements are now circumscribed by the
congressional purpose in enacting section 4-giving the interested pub-
lic an opportunity to participate and insuring that the agency is fully
informed before it promulgates rules having substantial impact.' 34
This approach should similarly be used to determine the "outer bound-
aries" of adjudications. If standards developed by adjudication are
generalized to have a "substantial impact" on an industry or a segment
of the public, then the basic purpose of section 4 still requires notice to
and an opportunity to comment by those subject to the standards. In-
deed, Congress' concerns in establishing the rulemaking process apply
more fully to standards developed by adjudication than to interpretive
rules and general statements of policy. In adjudication proceedings,
not only does the agency not have the benefit of public participation,
but also, in the absence of codification and publication, the agency's
position is unlikely to be defined clearly. Thus, development of rules
through adjudication further frustrates the congressional purpose be-
hind section 4.
The abuse of discretion test, which is normally applied in deter-
mining whether the agency should have used the rulemaking process,
fails to consider that Congress' purpose in establishing the rulemaking
process was to ensure fairness and accuracy in the formulation of pol-
icy. The abuse of discretion test is instead concerned with retroactivity,
as demonstrated in a recent Eighth Circuit case:
We entertain no doubt now that the Board does have the power to
announce new principles of law in an adjudicatory proceeding....
In deciding whether to exercise that power, however, the Board must
weigh the benefits to be achieved by the new interpretation of the law
against the detrimental effects of retroactive application of the new
rule. 135
Consequently, consideration of the propriety of adjudication rather
than rulemaking has been largely confined to the issue of injury to the
individual litigants-injury in the sense that the agency had not yet
134. Anderson v. Butz, 550 F.2d 459, 462-63 (9th Cir. 1977); Pickus v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
135. Drug Package, Inc. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 1340, 1346 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1978). See also Retail,
Wholesale & Dep't Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 388-93 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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held the individual actions to be illegal at the time the actions were
taken.136 By focusing on the detrimental effect of retroactive applica-
tion of standards, the abuse of discretion test ignores the way in which
these standards are initially formulated. 37
This lack of attention to the manner of rule formulation is illus-
trated by a recent labor law decision. Although vested with jurisdiction
over all cases "affecting commerce," the National Labor Relations
Board, in order to "focus its resources," has formulated "discretionary
jurisdictional standards." These standards had been developed by ad-
judication. 38 In NLRB v. Children's Baptist Home,139 the respondent
"Baptist Home," a nonprofit resident care center for emotionally dis-
turbed children, became embroiled in a welter of conflicting National
Labor Relations Board jurisdictional standards regarding nonprofit in-
stitutions. In response to a union petition for certification as the collec-
tive bargaining representative of Baptist Home employees, the
National Labor Relations Board, relying on recent adjudications ap-
proving jurisdiction over similar institutions, determined that it also
had jurisdiction over the Baptist Home. The Baptist Home did not
then contest this determination. However, when the Board announced
"a policy of declining jurisdiction over nonprofit child care centers"'' 40
in another adjudication a year later, the Baptist Home naturally asked
that this new policy of declining jurisdiction be applied to it. The
Board, however, refused to relinquish jurisdiction, and the certification
proceedings continued. Then the Board, completely routing that
hobgoblin of consistency, reversed itself again in another adjudication,
and returned to its initial standard of exercising jurisdiction over non-
136. This tying of the propriety of rulemaking to the problem of retroactive agency action
results from the common overgeneralization of the Supreme Court decision in SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). Chener/s disposition of a retroactivity problem unfortunately came to
be regarded as a decision that an agency can, in its discretion, formulate law by adjudication
rather than rulemaking. See text accompanying notes 64-68 supra.
137. Also, the abuse of discretion test is contrary to APA requirements for rulemaking. The
legislative history of the Act indicates that the only situation in which "discretion" exists is with
respect to actions specifically excepted from the rulemaking requirement. For example, with re-
spect to the section 4 exception from rulemaking of matters relating to "public property, loans,
grants, benefits or contracts," the House report states that
these exceptions are not to be taken as encouraging agencies not to adopt voluntary
public rule making procedures where useful to the agency or beneficial to the public.
They merely confer a discretion upon agencies to decide what, if any, public rule making
procedures shall be utilized in a given situation within their terms.
H. REP. No. 1980, supra note 33, at 23. See also text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
138. NLRB v. Children's Baptist Home, 576 F.2d 256, 258 & n.l (9th Cir. 1978).
139. Id
140. Id at 258-59 (emphasis added). This reversal in jurisdictional standards was announced
in Ming Quong Children's Center, 210 N.L.R.B. 899 (1974).
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profit child care homes. 14 1 Relying on this latest standard, the Board
finally rejected the Baptist Home's arguments that the Board should
not exercise its jurisdiction and ordered the Home to bargain with the
union.
The Baptist Home, before the federal court of appeals, argued that
the Board's use of adjudicatory proceedings rather than rulemaking to
set the jurisdictional standards was improper. Utilizing the "abuse of
discretion intertwined with retroactivity" test, the court stated that the
Baptist Home had the "burden of showing that the Board's actions
were unfair and that the [Baptist Home] was to some degree prejudiced
by that unfairness." 42 The court was unable to find that the Board's
"two complete reversals on an important question of jurisdictional pol-
icy without the notice and comment safeguards were. . . unfair vis-a-
vis the Homes."' 43 The absence of rulemaking, "vis-a-vis the Home,"
was not considered unfair since the original assertion of jurisdiction
over the Home was consistent with the standard in effect when the
Board's order was finally issued, 44 never mind the vacillating standards
in the interim.
Because it applied the abuse of discretion analysis, the court had
no call to consider whether Congress' purposes in establishing the
rulemaking process were frustrated by the Board's refusal to use this
process to develop jurisdictional standards. Had it done so, it probably
would have found that a jurisdictional standard subjecting these non-
profit child care homes to the labor laws did have a substantial impact
on labor-management relations in this service industry. Thus, the in-
dustry was entitled to prior participation in the formulation of the stan-
dards. Moreover, Congress intended that the agency educate itself by
public participation in order to achieve more accurate and enduring
standards. Obviously, the National Labor Relations Board's erratic re-
versals of standards over a short period indicate the inconsistency of
the adjudicatory process with that goal. Finally, Congress intended
that standards affecting the profession be stated in published rules of
uniform application. By contrast, the adjudicatory route resulted in in-
consistency: one standard for one home, another standard for the sec-
ond, then the original standard for the third, and so on. All these
factors would have been examined under the "substantial impact" ap-
proach to rulemaking versus adjudication problems; they were ignored
under the prevailing abuse of discretion approach.
141. 576 F.2d at 259; see Rhode Island Catholic Orphan Asylum, 224 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1976).
142. 576 F.2d at 260.
143. Id
144. Id at 260-61.
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V. CONCLUSION
Recognition that Congress established the rulemaking process as
an exclusive means of developing standards that significantly affect the
private sector should have the incidental effect of resolving certain
problems plaguing administrative law. For example, President Carter
is concerned with the proliferation of agency rules of questionable
worth.' 45 Use of "the test of prior examination and comment by the
affected parties"' 46 might eliminate the problems of a standard's sus-
pect value and its acceptability to the affected public.
Another modern concern is that the "delegation doctrine" has not
been a successful means of curtailing unchecked and arbitrary agency
lawmaking. 47 This doctrine, a separation of powers concept, states
that Congress should provide the agency with substantive standards for
implementing broad legislative provisions. Recognizing Congress' fail-
ure under this doctrine to supply standards sufficiently precise to pre-
vent unconfined agency lawmaking, some courts and commentators
suggest redefining the doctrine to shift it from a requirement of "statu-
tory standards" to a requirement of "administrative standards" "pro-
vided by administrative rulemaking."' 48 Their theory is that the
agency will confine itself by rulemaking and publication of rules,
thereby preventing the arbitrariness that can result from the ad hoc
application of a broad statutory standard. This redefinition of the dele-
gation doctrine, however, seems conceptually awkward, especially since
the doctrine itself is a constitutional concept with a separation of pow-
ers basis. Imposition of rulemaking requirements to prevent arbitrary
agency action is already justified because Congress, through the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, has linked its delegation of lawmaking au-
thority to the requirement that this authority be exercised pursuant to
the rulemaking process.
Another current problem is an occasional agency propensity for
abrupt and unexplained changes in policy. Such changes are usually
the result of ad hoc adjudicatory processes, and the courts have in-
veighed against them. To illustrate, the Civil Aeronautics Board, by an
adjudication, revoked air routes to two municipalities, contrary to its
past policy supporting the continuation of the routes. The First Circuit
145. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
146. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Department of Energy, 449 F. Supp. 760, 799 (D. Del. 1978)
(quoting National Helium Corp. v. FEA, 569 F.2d 1137, 1146 (Emer. Ct. App. 1978)), a dsub
non Standard Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029 (Emer. Ct. App. 1978).
147. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES-TExT-PROBLEMS 43-45 (6th ed. 1977);
B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATVE LAW § 18 (1976).
148. K. DAVIS, supra note 57, §§ 2.00-4 to -5, at 52-53.
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found that the Civil Aeronautics Board's disregard of its past policy
was reversible error.149 The court explained that while an "agency's
view of what is in the public interest may change, ...an agency
changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis indicating that
prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed not casu-
ally ignored."' 50 Rather than looking as it did to an uncertain "com-
mon law" of agency procedure as the source of the agency's "duty to
define and apply its policies in a minimally responsible and even-
handed way,"' 1' the court could have looked to the congressional re-
quirement that policy be formulated by the rulemaking process. This
rulemaking process contains procedural safeguards sufficient to insure
a rational, evenhanded application of new policy.' 52
The reasons for the courts' hesitation to exclude adjudication and
to require rulemaking proceedings seem to arise from insufficient atten-
tion to the direction of Congress, from confusion created by Supreme
Court decisions, and from misdirections caused by the substantive rule
test. Another and perhaps more substantial reason is the notion that an
agency ought to have flexibility in its choice of procedure: an agency
should be able "to choose a procedural format it deems appropriate for
the development of substantive policy.' 53 But, as the Supreme Court
recently acknowledged, 54 this discretion is largely preserved by the
rulemaking process. The rulemaking process merely requires that a
form of public procedure be available so that interested parties have
some opportunity to present their views and that standards affecting a
segment of the public be codified and published. Beyond these mini-
mal requirements, an agency has substantial opportunities to fashion
procedures. Policy may be developed "by oral or written communica-
tion and consultation; by specially summoned conferences; by advisory
committees; or by hearings."' 155 If an agency determines that disputed
factual matters need development beyond that of bare comment, then it
may subject these matters to more intensive procedures; it may, for ex-
149. Maine v. CAB, 520 F.2d 1240, 1245 (1st Cir. 1975).
150. Id at 1245.
151. Id (quoting Distrigas of Massachusetts Corp. v. FPC, 517 F.2d 761, 765 (1st Cir. 1975)).
152. In particular, APA section 4(b) requires that, after standards are formulated by public
procedure, these standards be published, along with "a general statement of their basis and pur-
pose." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976). This statement of the basis and purpose and the rule in itself
should supply the "reasoned analysis" that the court in Maine v. CAB, 520 F.2d 1240 (1st Cir.
1975), deemed necessary.
153. Alianza Federal de Mercedes v. FCC, 539 F.2d 732, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
154. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978).
155. ATr'Y GENERAL'S REP. 103.
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ample, test these matters by a form of cross-examination. 56
Apart from the merits of rulemaking, however, a greater principle
bars agencies and reviewing courts from substituting adjudication for
rulemaking. Congress, in delegating lawmaking authority to the agen-
cies, established rulemaking as the exclusive process and cautioned the
courts against subverting the integrity of the Administrative Procedure
Act by "indirection."' 157 Rather, the courts are to enforce the Act and
let practice expose its deficiencies. Then, according to Congress,
"amendatory or supplementary legislation can supply any deficiency
which experience discloses .... ,,158 The greater principle, then, is an
orderly scheme of legislative control.
156. Id 109.
157. S. REP. No. 752 at 29. The Supreme Court recently cautioned reviewing courts "against
engrafting their own notions of proper procedures upon agencies entrusted with substantive func-
tions by Congress." Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 525 (1978). The Court further recognized the APA as "a legislative
enactment which settled 'long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and enacts a formula upon
which opposing social and political forces have come to rest."' Id at 523 (quoting Wong Yang
Sun v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950)).
158. S. Ra. No. 752 at 30. In fact, Congress has exercised its supervisory functions. With
respect to the adjudication or rulemaking problem, it has amended agency procedures to allow for
special needs. The FTC, for example, occasionally is involved in substantial adjudication against
an industry with a closely knit, cohesive membership. Congress, by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Improvement Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976), gave the FTC authority to issue an
order-resulting from an adjudicative finding of an unfair or deceptive practice--that is binding
on the entire industry. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B) (1976).

